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“Indianizing the Confederacy”:
Understandings of War Cruelty 
During the American Civil War and 
the Sioux Uprising of 1862
Zachary Brown
Stanford University
 For much of  early American history, the general public’s 
racially charged preconceptions of  “Indian war,” defined by 
stereotypes of  guerrilla fighting and “savage” atrocities such as 
scalping, were central to how Americans understood the terrors 
of  war. Often forgotten today though, is the prominent role this 
fear played during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The fear 
of  Indian war allowed for clear, and often intentional, parallels 
to be discerned by onlookers between the reported natives’ 
atrocities of  the Dakota War (1862) in Minnesota (also known as 
the Sioux Uprising of  1862) and the concurrent American Civil 
War. The presence of  Native American combatants on Civil War 
battlefields resulted in the “indianizing” of  the Union’s enemy, 
which ranged from criticisms of  the Confederacy’s interest 
and success in recruiting and employing indigenous support to 
censures of  the tactics and morals maintained by the Confederate 
military and political leadership in all theatres of  the war. The 
Union’s rhetoric of  indianizing the Confederacy also helped to 
solidify the rumors of  southern agents encouraging the Sioux 
Uprising.
 This paper examines how the rhetoric of  indianizing 
the enemy influenced northerners’ understandings of  the Civil 
War and the Dakota War as well as the connections between 
these armed conflicts. By tying Indian war and its accompanying 
atrocities to Confederate policies, the northern press purposefully 
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connected the Dakota War to a pre-existing racial framework 
of  Indian-Confederate convergence that had, particularly in 
reaction to the Battle of  Pea Ridge (March 1862) in the Civil 
War, emerged earlier. Understanding the connections between 
these two wars of  rebellion provides insight into the psyche of  
northern civilians in 1862 and offers a unique perspective on the 
role of  Native Americans during the Civil War era.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY BEFORE
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
 The rhetorical strategy of  comparing American enemies 
to the “savagery” of  indigenous populations has a long and 
controversial history as war propaganda dating back to the 
Colonial Period. During the American War of  Independence 
(1775-1783), revolutionary propagandists accused their British 
and Loyalist opponents of  enabling Indian “savagery”— 
particularly scalping. Similarly, Tories responded in kind. 
Immediately following the Battles of  Lexington and Concord 
(April 1775), British General Thomas Gage, then serving as 
the Royal Governor of  Massachusetts, published a broadside 
in Boston claiming that his forces had found three British 
“Soldiers on the Ground one of  them scalped, his Head much 
mangled, and his Ears cut off, tho’ not quite dead; a Sight which 
struck the Soldiers with horror.”1 The British publication Scots 
Magazine also responded to the incident by describing Americans 
through racial comparisons to Indian “savages.” The magazine 
declared that the Americans’ “humanity is written in the indelible 
characters with the blood of  the soldiers scalped and googed 
[sic] at Lexington.”2
 Another famous case is that of  Thomas ‘Burnfoot’ 
Brown. A Loyalist from Georgia, Brown refused to join the 
revolutionaries’ cause and, subsequently, was captured by 
the Sons of  Liberty. According to Brown’s testimony, he was 
“o’erpowered, stabbed in many places, my skull fractured 
Penn History Review     117 
Indianizing the Confederacy
by a blow from a rifle, [and then] I was dragged in a state of  
insensibility to Augusta. My hair was then chiefly torn up by the 
roots; what remained stripped off  by knives; my head scalped 
in 3 or 4 different places; my legs tarred and burnt by lighted 
torches, from which I lost the use of  two of  my toes.”3 While 
the veracity of  this incident and other reported confrontations 
of  “barbarous” violence is suspect, these dramatic accounts 
gained popularity and prevalence in the press and demonstrated 
the extent to which both the British in the metropole and the 
Loyalists in North America used the racial rhetoric of  Indian war 
to demonize their American adversaries.
 While British media charged Americans with Indian 
savagery, most accusations of  barbarianism during the War of  
Independence came from the revolutionary polemic directed 
against the British. Arguably the most famous of  these rhetorical 
attacks was the tale of  Jane McCrea, the intended bride of  a 
Loyalist lieutenant, who was abducted by Indians allied with 
the British commander John Burgoyne, and then shot and 
scalped. In response to the news, General Horatio Gates of  
the Continental Army sent a letter denouncing Burgoyne to 
the Second Continental Congress and newspaper outlets in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, declaring:
That the savages of  America should…mangle and scalp…
[is not new]…that the famous lieut. Gen. Burgoyne…
should hire the Savages of  America to scalp Europeans 
and the descendants of  Europeans; nay more, that he 
should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is 
more than will be believed in Europe, until authenticated 
facts shall, in every Gazette, convince mankind of  the 
truth of  the horrid tale.4
Following its publication in Philadelphia, McCrea’s story spread 
quickly throughout the American Colonies and outraged 
colonists, inspiring greater support for independence. As a 
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result, pro-American newspapers began this trend to “indianize” 
the British. For example, in 1781, Philadelphia’s Freeman’s Journal 
wrote that British support of  Native Americans was evidence 
that they were “the same brutes and savages they were when 
Julius Caesar invaded … for it is certain their mixture with the 
Saxons and other foreigners, has done very little toward their 
civilization.”5 Employing racially charged language previously 
used exclusively against Native Americans, the American press 
during the War of  Independence denounced their British enemies 
as unredeemable savages who emulated, and even surpassed, the 
cruelty of  their Native American allies.
 Americans revived this form of  propaganda again 
during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), as proponents 
of  the war often likened Mexicans to Indian “savages” based on 
racist concepts of  “race-mixing” between the natives and the 
Spanish colonizers. For example, Senator Robert J. Walker of  
Mississippi claimed that “five sixths” of  Mexico’s population 
was of  “the mixed races, speaking more than twenty different 
languages, composed of  every poisonous compound of  blood 
and color…[and are] barbarous hordes.”6 Thus, when reports 
of  Indian violence under Confederate command reached 
northern civilians during the Civil War, the Union press revived 
the rhetorical strategy by associating Indian savagery to lambast 
Confederate forces.
THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE
AND INDIANIZING THE CONFEDERACY
 The most explosive incident of  Native American 
engagement in the main theaters of  the Civil War occurred in 
March 1862 at the Battle of  Pea Ridge, near Leetown on the 
northwest corner of  Arkansas. Pea Ridge was the first major battle 
to feature Indian troops, mostly Cherokee, under the command 
of  Confederate Brigadier General Albert Pike.7 Indeed, a majority 
of  the Cherokee people, one of  the five indigenous nations 
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known collectively as the Five Civilized Tribes, had allied with 
the Confederacy after meeting with a delegation led by Pike in 
the summer of  1861.8 Nonetheless, Pike, under orders of  Major 
Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, was pessimistic about 
the native battalions he commanded. While Van Dorn favorably 
described Pike’s 2500 native soldiers as “half  breed Indians, and 
good reliable men,” the Brigadier General later claimed that the 
troops were “entirely undisciplined, mounted chiefly on ponies 
and armed very indifferently with common rifles and ordinary 
shotguns.”9
 Moreover, the militarily inexperienced Pike struggled to 
control his indigenous battalions once engaged in combat. After 
taking the Union position at Foster’s Farm during the Battle 
of  Pea Ridge, the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles routed two 
companies of  the Third Iowa Cavalry directed by Lieutenant-
Colonel Henry Trimble. Contrary to Pike’s desires, in the ensuing 
Plan of  the Battlefield of  Pea Ridge, near Leetown, Arkansas
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chaos, the native troops scalped eight Union soldiers in Trimble’s 
detachment.10 Consequently, Colonel Cyrus Bussey, the chief  
commanding officer of  the Third Iowa Cavalry, informed his 
superior, Samuel R. Curtis, the commander of  the Army of  the 
Southwest:
[I] had the dead exhumed, and on personal examination…
found that it was a fact beyond dispute that eight of  the 
killed of  my command had been scalped…first having 
fallen in the charge…they were afterwards pierced 
through the heart and neck with knives by a savage and 
relentless foe.11
While the Union forces under Curtis recovered to win the 
Battle of  Pea Ridge, the incident at Foster’s Farm dominated 
in the press. Van Dorn tried to repress and excuse the incident, 
claiming through his Adjutant General Dabney H. Maury that 
Curtis was “misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians 
who formed part of  [Pike’s] forces having for many years been 
regarded as civilized people.” Van Dorn also accused Union 
forces of  committing their own atrocities, primarily blaming 
Germans, the largest ethnic group employed by Union forces, 
thereby attempting to capitalize on Confederates’ attempts to 
revive anti-Hessian sentiment first harbored during the War of  
Independence.12 In particular, Van Dorn employed the racially 
charged accusation that captured Confederate soldiers had been 
“murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be 
Germans.”13 However, despite Van Dorn’s allegations Pike felt 
compelled to write to Curtis personally, expressing horror at the 
atrocity, and chastised his troops accordingly, issuing an order 
prohibiting the practice of  scalping.14
 Despite Pike’s efforts to discipline his indigenous troops 
after the incident, the northern press lambasted the Brigadier 
General. In the aftermath of  Pea Ridge, anti-Confederate 
propaganda converged on Pike with the racially motivated 
Penn History Review     121 
Indianizing the Confederacy
rhetoric of  Indian War. The most prominent source for this 
propaganda came from an article in the New-York Tribune written 
by journalist Junius Henri Browne.15 Browne’s melodramatic 
account of  the battle described Pike as a man “who deserves 
and will doubtless receive eternal infamy…for inducing savages 
to [perform] shocking barbarities…[ordering] scalping and 
robbing…their favorite pastimes…[for] they plundered every 
wounded, dying and dead Unionist they could find…[murdering 
those] incapable of  resistance.” Browne then emphasized, “the 
[Confederate] rebels did everything…to excite them into a 
frenzy giving them large quantities of  whiskey and gunpowder 
a few minutes previous to the commencement of  hostilities.”16 
In an editorial in the New-York Tribune a few days later, again 
Pike was described in terms that resemble a pejorative attack on 
indigenous warriors:
Pike [is a] ferocious fish…[who] got himself  up in 
good style, war-paint, nose-ring and all…[he] led the 
Aboriginal Corps of  Tomahawkers and Scalpers at the 
Battle of  Pea Ridge…was indicted for playing the part 
of  Squeers, and cruelly beating and starving a boy in his 
family. He escaped by some hocus-pocus of  a law and 
emigrated to the West, where the violence of  his nature 
has been admirably enhanced…[he] has fought duels 
enough to qualify…[as] a leader of  savages…[he is a] 
new Pontiac…and betaken himself  to the culture of  the 
Great Spirit…[or] Spirits—Whisky being the second. So 
much for Pike!17
The sensationalized detail afforded to descriptions of  Pike and 
accusations of  Indian treachery, however, were more likely an 
attempt to distract readers from the vagueness of  Browne’s 
account of  the actual fighting: 
Desperate but desultory; now here, now there, at one 
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Journalist Junius Henri Browne’s fraudulent map detailing the “positions” 
of  Union and Confederate forces at the Battle of  Pea Ridge
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moment on a hill, at the next in a ravine. Skirmishing 
was visible everywhere and hard hand-to-hand fighting 
in every quarter of  the field. Now advancing, now 
retreating were our forces; now marching forward, now 
countermarching; now appearing, now disappearing, but 
ever moving forward to victory.18
Indeed, in its specificities, Browne’s account of  the fighting 
was fictitious. The journalist’s description of  the Confederate 
position differed from those relayed by other war correspondents, 
including Browne’s main rival, Thomas Knox of  the New York 
Herald, who also claimed to be present at the Battle of  Pea Ridge. 
To be sure, unlike Knox’s account, Browne’s article featured a 
wildly inaccurate map on which he placed commanders in 
incorrect locations and claimed that the battle took place in an 
area four times as large as the actual battlefield. While Knox 
and fellow reporter William Fayel of  the Daily Missouri Democrat 
did verify Browne’s claim that scalping occurred—which was 
also later confirmed by Union military reports—there was no 
evidence or corroborating witness to substantiate Browne’s most 
extraordinary accusation: that Pike’s Indians also attacked and 
scalped their Confederate allies in the violent frenzy that followed 
the assault on the Third Iowa Cavalry. These inconsistencies, 
therefore, support the notion that Browne was not present at 
Pea Ridge and that the journalist’s account was propagandistic 
yellow journalism most likely mixed with facts, rumors, hearsay, 
and self-invented narratives to demonize the Confederates. Still, 
to the anxious northerners who read Browne’s article, Pike was 
no better than the savage natives he commanded, despite the 
fact that the Brigadier General discouraged scalping among his 
men.19 
 Meanwhile, Knox’s more accurate account of  the battle 
gained little traction among readers. It would take a month 
until the New York Herald even chastised Browne and the New-
York Tribune for deceiving the public through “imposture more 
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flagitious [than] is…conceivable.”20 But the resulting war of  
words between the New York Herald and the New-York Tribune 
produced only mild public outcry. In 1862, as a quick end to 
war appeared increasingly unlikely, anxious northerners were 
more concerned with demonizing their Confederate enemies 
than obtaining accurate accounts of  a battle in the distant Trans-
Mississippi Theater. In fact, by the time the fraudulence of  
Browne’s account was exposed, it was already being celebrated 
in Britain as a model of  war journalism and being praised by the 
influential editor of  the New-York Tribune, Horace Greeley, as a 
story that “should be placed in every National soldier’s hands.”21 
Thus, while this one incident conducted by the First Cherokee 
Mounted Rifles in the Trans-Mississippi Theater occurred far 
away from the primary focus of  the Civil War (the Eastern 
Theater), it is evident that the sensationalized journalism of  
Browne helped revive the rhetoric of  “savage” Indian violence 
as a way to describe Confederate enemies. Consequently, as the 
Dakota War began in the late summer of  1862, the reported 
horrors of  scalping at Pea Ridge was the enduring vision of  
Indian war maintained by many northerners, making the rumors 
of  a Confederate plot unfolding in Minnesota seem likely. 
THE DAKOTA WAR AND
THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1862
 Caused by a host of  regional tensions between white 
settlers—food shortages, treaty violations, and the corruption 
of  government agencies regulating Native American affairs—
and exacerbated by the military and financial pressures of  the 
Civil War, the Dakota War in Minnesota was one of  the most 
significant Indian Wars of  the nineteenth century.22 The conflict 
launched a period of  nearly thirty years of  intermittent warfare 
between the United States and the Sioux, often referred to as the 
Sioux Wars, that did not end until “Siouxan independence came 
to its final, tragic end on a cold day in December, 1890, in the 
Penn History Review     125 
Indianizing the Confederacy
Massacre at Wounded Knee.”23
 Despite its military and causal ties to the Civil War, most 
Americans regarded the Dakota War as a peripheral event in 
1862. Nevertheless, the Dakota War haunted northerners as a 
powerful symbol of  the disastrous setbacks that had plagued the 
Union war effort throughout the year. Decisive successes in the 
Western Theater, including at Pea Ridge and Shiloh, did little to 
assuage anxiety over the ensuing failures of  Union forces in the 
East. The most prominent of  these setbacks was the disastrous 
defeat at the Second Battle of  Bull Run in August at the hands 
of  General Robert E. Lee and the Army of  Northern Virginia. 
The Union defeat was so embarrassing that President Abraham 
Lincoln relieved the foremost Union commander, Major 
General John Pope, from his position and reassigned Pope to 
the Department of  the Northwest in Minnesota to command 
troops in the Dakota War. 
 Few Americans outside of  Minnesota saw the rebellion 
in the Dakota as a central concern or even understood the Sioux 
Uprising’s connections to the Civil War. However, the distant 
conflict emerged as an outlet for northerners to externalize their 
anxiety as the once unimaginable prospect of  Union military 
collapse seemed increasingly possible with the threat of  a 
Confederate and Indian western front. Northern anxiety about 
a Confederate and Indian alliance in the West, combined with 
reports of  atrocities from the Minnesota front, resulted in the 
revival of  the rhetoric of  Confederate-Indian convergence that 
had emerged following the Battle of  Pea Ridge. Deep-seated 
fears and stereotypes of  Indian war among northerners made 
it easy for Union magazines and newspapers to connect the 
Confederacy’s use of  “savage” Indian allies at Pea Ridge to the 
reports of  atrocities during the Dakota War.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY IN THE DAKOTA WAR
 Reports of  violent atrocities committed by Native 
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Americans were common during the Dakota War. For example, 
on August 18, 1862, following a raid by natives on the Schwandt 
family, August Schwandt, recounted, “the daughter of  Mr. 
Schwandt [August’s sister, Karolina Schwandt Walz], enceinte 
[pregnant], was cut open, as was learned afterward, the child 
taken alive from the mother, and nailed to a tree...It struggled 
some time after the nails were driven through it!”24 Similarly, a 
female captive who was living with the Sioux observed, “A boy 
twelve years of  age, whose parents had probably been murdered, 
fretted and cried a good deal of  the time, saying he wanted to 
go home. The Indians killed him by cutting him into pieces, 
commencing at his feet and then cutting his legs into small 
chunks.”25 While the kind of  sensationalized violence typical of  
this literature reflected real anxieties of  white settlers and soldiers 
on the Minnesota frontier, these and similar reports should be 
read with skepticism. As Colonel Henry H. Sibley wrote to his 
wife Sarah, “Do not believe the thousand extravagant reports 
you hear. People are absolutely crazy with excitement and credit 
every absurdity.”26 Nevertheless, these accounts of  atrocities all 
featured grotesque violence and greatly exceeded the brutality 
of  common stereotypes of  Indian war, including scalping. But 
contrary to the popular perception of  Indian war at the time, 
white settlers and soldiers rarely reported scalping performed by 
Indians during the Dakota War.
 Ironically, Union troops and white settlers were 
responsible for the most well-known scalping incidents during this 
armed conflict, including the scalping of  the famous Sioux leader, 
Little Crow.27 During the Dakota War, the state of  Minnesota 
institutionalized a bounty system to encourage scalping of  Native 
Americans. For instance, the Annual Report of  the Adjutant General 
for 1863, an account of  military activity in Minnesota during the 
previous year, disclosed that on August 7, 1862, a bounty of  
$75.00 (approximately $1800 in 2016 dollars) was paid to W.M. 
Allen for killing a single Sioux warrior, while on August 31, 
Julius Schmidt received a bounty of  $5.00 (approximately $120 
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in 2016 dollars) for tanning a native’s scalp.28 This state sanction 
of  indiscriminate violence, coupled with a financial incentive, 
largely normalized the practice of  scalping among white troops. 
In his account of  the Battle of  New Ulm (August 1862), Colonel 
Charles Eugene Flandreau, the leading American commander in 
the engagement, described how without any trepidation “a half  
breed named Le Blanc lay in the grass as our men advanced, and 
fired and wounded one of  them…[so] a bullet sped after him, 
and cut the great artery on the shoulder…[Le Blanc] was soon 
finished, his head cut off  and scalped.”29 As whites, rather than 
natives, were the primary scalpers of  the Dakota War, the kind 
“Indian Outrages in The North-west—An American Family Murdered by 
the Sioux Indians, in a Grove Near New Elm, Minnesota—From a Sketch by 
a Correspondent.”
This cartoon was based on exaggerated reports of  Native American 
“atrocities” committed in the Minnesota frontier. This kind of  hyperbolic 
depiction of  violence stimulated northern anxiety, fueling the rhetoric of  
Confederate-Indian convergence in northern media outlets during 
the Dakota War.
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of  stereotypical Native American violence that the Confederates 
supposedly encouraged at Pea Ridge was conspicuously absent, 
belying the rumors that the Sioux Uprising was a Confederate 
orchestrated plot. 
 Yet, despite their own use of  scalping (among 
other atrocities), northern whites often vilified scalping as a 
sanguineous and treacherous indigenous practice. Following 
the Battle of  Fort Abercrombie (September 1862), white settler 
Edgar Wright was found mutilated as his body was “ripped up 
from the navel to the throat. The heart and liver taken out. The 
lungs left on the chest, the head cut off  scalped and struck in 
the cavity of  the abdomen with the face toward the feet.”30 
Additionally, Private William Schultz was found nearby, “with 
his skull smashed in, and his brains scattered about.”31 But, 
upon further review, white troops had committed similar actions 
earlier at New Ulm and Wood Lake (September 1862). Still, these 
atrocities were not acknowledged, as evidenced by the St. Cloud 
Democrat: the newspaper denounced these acts as uniquely the 
work of  indigenous “savages” and “demons” who sought to use 
“their most diabolical and ingenious devices of  cruelty” against 
innocent settlers.32
 While this hypocrisy was certainly racially motivated, 
it was also a conscious choice to rationalize the expulsion and 
mass annihilation of  the Sioux. Accounts of  scalping during 
the Dakota War emphasized the innocence of  white victims 
compared to the wickedness of  Sioux savagery. The St. Cloud 
Democrat claimed that those scalped at Fort Abercrombie were 
“void of  offense toward their foe, men of  unblemished reputation 
against whom the Indians could have had no memory of  wrongs 
to be revenged.” The newspaper celebrated Wright for being a 
man with a “high sense of  honor and strict integrity” who had 
kindly befriended the Sioux before they cruelly betrayed him. 
Minnesota newspapers used the sensationalized accounts of  these 
atrocities to support the conclusion that the Native Americans 
were malevolent “Hell Hounds” who had to be “swept from 
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the face of  the Earth, old and young, male and female.”33 This 
kind of  genocidal anti-native rhetoric remained common in the 
aftermath of  the Sioux Uprising, as evidenced by renown social 
reformer Harriet E. Bishop, who recalled gory descriptions of  
violent atrocities committed by the indigenous population and 
called these acts necessary to ensure that “Indian sympathizers 
may see the diabolical natures of  the foe our State has had to 
meet. We think it a mock philanthropy which would screen these 
guilty, unprovoked wretched from merited justice.”34 Evidently, 
scalping, while ironically more commonly used by white soldiers 
than Native Americans, emerged as a powerful symbol through 
which Minnesotans encouraged and rationalized the elimination 
of  the Sioux.
 When news of  these atrocities reached anxious Union 
audiences in the East, the northern readers were horrified. 
However, rather than simply demonize the natives like their 
counterparts in St. Cloud, presses in New York quickly co-opted 
the rhetoric established in reactions to Pea Ridge to describe 
the atrocities of  the Dakota War. The resulting escalation of  
the fictitious rumors of  a Confederate plot in Minnesota in 
Union magazines and newspapers reveals the extent to which 
northern audiences understood the Dakota War through the lens 
of  the Civil War. This can be seen in an infamous cartoon of  
the Sioux Uprising published by the New York based Harper’s 
Weekly magazine on September 13, 1862. Published ten days 
before the decisive defeat of  Chief  Little Crow and the Sioux 
forces at the Battle of  Wood Lake, which ended the conflict’s 
main military phase, the cartoon supported the ongoing rumors 
that the Dakota War, and the “savagery” practiced by the Sioux, 
was the product of  a Confederate plot. 
 The image, and its accompanying caption, directly 
connected the Sioux Uprising to a Confederate plot through the 
long-standing tropes of  Indian war that had been recently revived 
through the press following reactions to the Battle of  Pea Ridge. 
The natives depicted in the image resemble the “subhuman 
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and wanton brutes” that Browne in the New-York Tribune had 
described as fighters for the Confederacy at Pea Ridge: “the 
appearance of  some of  the besotted savages was fearful. They 
lost their sense of  caution and fear, and ran with long knives 
against large odds…with bloody hands and garments…with 
glittering eyes and horrid scowls, they raged about the field with 
terrible yells.”35 In fact, even though Browne’s article and the 
cartoon in Harper’s Weekly depicted the scalping of  two distinct 
defenseless groups—Browne detailed the scalping of  wounded 
soldiers at Pea Ridge, while the the cartoon centered on the 
scalping of  women and infants—it is worth noting that since the 
Colonial Period, wounded soldiers and women were regarded 
“I am happy to inform you that, in spite both of  blandishments and threats, 
used in profusion by the agents of  the government of  the United States, the 
Indian nations within the confederacy have remained firm in their loyalty and 
steadfast in the observance of  their treaty.
(The above Extract from JEFF DAVIS’S last Message will serve to explain 
the News from Minnesota.)”
The scalping scene depicted here does not resemble most accounts of  Native 
American violence reported from the Minnesota Front, and, most likely, was 
the product of  the artist’s preconceived stereotypes of  “Indian war.”
Penn History Review     131 
Indianizing the Confederacy
as the typical victims of  savage physical mutilation. Far from an 
accurate portrayal of  the violence of  the Dakota War, however, 
the Harper’s Weekly image, like the Browne’s fraudulent account 
of  the Battle of  Pea Ridge, was a reflection of  how Americans 
had reimagined the horrors of  Indian war during the Civil War.
 While the fear of  Indian war had long been a part of  the 
American psyche, its renewed effectiveness stemmed from its 
ability to indianize, and thereby demonize, Confederate rebels. 
The New-York Tribune described the natives’ behavior at Pea 
Ridge as unremarkable, with the savages having only “repeated 
the outrages upon civilized warfare and the shocking barbarities 
with which our early history has made us familiar.”36 Similarly, 
the fact that the Sioux were scalping women and children in the 
Harper’s Weekly image was merely what most American’s had 
come to expect based on stereotypes of  Indian war. Moreover, 
the caption of  the Harper’s Weekly cartoon implied that through 
scalping, the Sioux “have remained firm in their loyalty and 
steadfast in the observance of  their treaty engagements with 
[the Confederacy].” The presence of  a liquor jug labeled “Agent 
C.S.A. [Confederate States of  America]” lying directly behind 
the violent scene reinforced the notion that the Confederacy 
encouraged these acts of  savage violence. Upon further review, 
the presence of  alcohol in both the denouncement of  Pike in 
the New-York Tribune and the cartoon in Harper’s Weekly opens 
up a series of  potential interpretations. It may be a reference to 
the long-standing stereotype of  alcoholism among indigenous 
communities. Alternatively, or perhaps, additionally, the 
presence of  alcohol in these depictions may seek to connect the 
Confederates to encouraging alcohol use and moral degeneration.
CONNECTING THE DAKOTA WAR AND THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR THROUGH INDIANIZATION
 While there is little evidence of  Confederate involvement 
in the Dakota War, the connection drawn between the Confederacy 
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and the Sioux atrocities would have seemed natural to a northern 
audience recently exposed to the reports of  Native Americans 
scalping at Pea Ridge. The attempts to associate Indian “savagery” 
and Confederate political and military policies suggested that the 
horror of  Native American violence was principally a product 
of  Confederate machinations. The accuracy of  the accounts was 
secondary, present only to create a veneer of  authenticity. Union 
critiques of  scalping, whether at Pea Ridge or in Minnesota, were 
primarily a pretense to criticize the Confederacy for enabling and 
allying with Indian savagery. 
 The Civil War and the Dakota War, while often viewed 
by scholars in isolation, appeared intrinsically linked for Union 
citizens on the home front. Northern propagandists used the 
racial understandings that underpinned this rhetoric to portray 
Indian savagery as convergent with the interests and principles 
of  the Confederacy in both politics and military leadership. 
These sources of  anti-Confederate propaganda revived the 
racial rhetoric of  Indian war that had first emerged during the 
Colonial Period, and served as an outlet for northern anxiety in 
the face of  military defeat in the East and the prospect of  a joint 
Confederate-Indian front in the West. 
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